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85 8318300 SCO

PAGE 001
TOR: 0320237 SEP 85 M03COW 12144

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E.O. 12356: DECL: NADR TAGS: PREL, UR, US, OVIP (BYRD, ROBERT) SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD/THURMOND: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

- CONFIDENTIAL FNTIRE TEXT. 1.
- 2. HEREWITH THE HIGHLIGHTS OF CODEL BYRD/THURMOND'S THREE AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH GORBACHEV SEPTEMBER 3. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS WE CAN PHT IT TOGETHER.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

STATE

85 8318300 SCO

PAGE 002 NC 8318300 TOR: 0320237 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12144

3. AFTER HANDING GORBACHEV PRESTDENT REAGAN'S LETTER. SENATOR BYRD OPENED WITH A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT THAT COVERED. TN BI-PARTISAN SPIRIT. BASIC U.S. POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION. REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. SENATOR THURMOND FULLY ENDORSED BYRD'S STATEMENT, UNDERSCORED SPPORTUNITY THAT NOVEMBER MEETING AFFORDED, AND SUPPORTED IDEA OF ANNUAL SUMMIT MEETINGS. SENATOR PELL CALLED FOR SUCH BILATERAL COOPERATIVE VENTURES AS USE OF LEND-LEASE REPAYMENTS TO FUND EXCHANGES OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET YOUNG PEOPLE. AND JOINT IMMUNIZATION DE WORLD'S CHILDREN. SENATORS NUNN AND WARNER DUTLINED THEIR "NIICIEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER" PROPOSAL.

4. KEY POINTS MADE BY GORBACHEV:

-- IN HIS BRIEF INTRODUCTION, GORBACHEV SAID RELATIONS WERE AT AN MALL-TIME LOWM AND MUST BE MOVED OFF DEAD CENTER. SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART BUT WOULD NOT BE INTIMIDATED. IT WAS BEST NOT TO DELVE INTO THE PAST BUT TO LEARN FROM HISTORY AND MOVE FORWARD ON RECIPROCAL.

-- UPON HEARING TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SORBACHEV SAID IT WAS MA GOOD LETTER. M ALTHOUGH POSITIVE WORDS NEFDED TO BE FOLLOWED BY PRACTICAL STEPS. IT WAS HERE THAT PROBLEMS AROSE.

GORBACHEV ADDED THAT A GROUP AROUND THE PRESIDENT. IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CONGRESS. ORIGINALLY OPPOSED THE NOVEMBER MEETING AND WAS NOW TRYING TO GUT IT OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE. THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE THE WISDOM TO DVERCOME THIS.

RESPONDING AT LENGTH TO SEVATOR BYRD'S OPENING STATEMENT. GORBACHEV FELT THE U.S. SIDE WAS TRYING TO BLACKEN THE SOVIET UNION WHILE WHITEHASHING THE U.S. AS WITH MCFARLANE'S RECENT SPEECH, THE

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

STATE 85 8318300 SCO PAGE 004 NC 8318300 TOR: 032023Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12144 SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD/THURMOND: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETING CONFIRM THE USSR'S PRINCIPLED POSITION IN FAVOR OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II AND THE ABM TREATY. THESE WERE THE "LAST BARRIERS" TO RESTRAIN THE ARMS RACE. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS INDEED TO OPPOSE DBSERVANCE OF THESE UNDERTAKINGS. ANY QUESTIONS ON DOUBTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE SCC. GORBACHEV REJECTED SENATOR BYRD'S EXPLANATION OF THE USG POSITION ON A TESTING MORATORIUM. ARGUING THAN THE U.S. TESTING PROGRAM HAD BEEN MORE INTENSIVE THAT THE USSR'S. HE INSISTED THAT THE SOVIET TEST PROGRAM HAD BEEN SUSPENDED BY A POLITICAL DECISION. IN THE FACE OF CRITICISM FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY. A TESTING MORATORIUM WOULD PLACE A BARRIER ACROSS THE KEY PROBLEM OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT HOULD ALSO BRING A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN EXISTING STOCKPILES. AS WARHEAD RELIABILITY DEGRADED. THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PATTENT, WANTED THE USG TO REACT RESPONSIBLY AND DELIBERATELY. AND HOPED IT THE TESTING U.S. ON THE TESTING MORATORIUM PROPOSAL. -- GORBACHEV SAID HE BASICALLY AGREED WITH SENATOR PELL'S BILATERAL PROPOSALS. IN RESPONSE TO THE VUNN/WARNER PROPOSAL ON RISK REDUCTION. GORBACHEV SAID THAT WHILE THE MAIN TASK WAS TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND LOWER NUCLEAR ARSENALS. THE NUNN/WARNER IDEA DESERVED ATTENTION. COMBS END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/29 : CIA-RDP87B00342R000501110001-9 **ILLEGIB** ITEMPO 8319576 24621217 FRP1 UNCLASSIFIED **STAT** STATE 95 8319576 SUO PAGE 001 NC 8319576 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146 DO RUEATIR ZVR UUJUU 70C STATE Z7H STU9247 ON RUEHC DE RUEHMO #2146/01 2462022 ZNR UUUUU 774 0 0320037 SEP 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHFO/USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHOVSECSTATE WASHOD IMMEDIATE 4458 INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 3845 31 UNCLAS MOSCOW 12146 USINFO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VJA/BRU STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV LENINGRAD FOR BPAN (ALLIN) E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985 UNCLASSIFIED

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 002 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85

NC 8319576 Moscow 12146

1. STATEMENTS, Q'S AND A'S. AT PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY CODEL BYRD AT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, MOSCOW U.S.S.R., SEPTEMBER 3, 1985.

SENATOR BRYD: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE APOLOGIZE FOR BEING SO LATE, BUT WE COULDN'T HELP IT. TODAY WE MET WITH THE SOVIET LEADER. HE IS ARTICULATE. TOUGH, ABLE. SERIOUS AND VERY MUCH WISHES THAT THE DIALOGUE BEGIN AND THAT THE RHETORIC BE LOWERED BY JUST A BIT. HE FEELS THAT THE TIME FOR BUILDING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SUMMIT IS NOW, THAT WE SHOULD START TO DEVELOP AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TOWARD PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT. HE, I THINK, SPOKE IN WAYS THAT WOULD -- CERTAINLY LEFT ME --WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE NEGATIVES AND THERE WERE POSTTIVES IN THIS MEETING. AND I THINK WE COULD EXPECT THAT, ALTHOUGH WE REGRET THAT SOME OF THE THINGS THAT WE DISCUSSED WERE NOT POSITIVE INSOFAR AS HIS RESPONSES WERE CONCERNED. LET'S TAKE AGHANISTAN. FOR EXAMPLE. I THINK THE RESPONSE THERE WAS PRACTICALLY NIL. SO WE DIDN'T GET ANYTHING THERE. ON HUMANS RIGHTS. I THINK WE HEARD ABOUT WHAT WE EXPECT -- THE USUAL DEFENSIVE REACTION. ON THE OVERALL MATTER OF ARMS CONTROL, I CAME AWAY FEELING THAT HIS RESPONSES WERE POSITIVE. IN WHAT WAY? WELL. ONLY YESTERDAY THIS DELEGATION MET WITH TWO OF THE TOP MILITARY PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, AND THE RESPONSE THERE TO DUR EXPRESSED EFFORTS WERE. IN MY JUDGEMENT. MERE STONEWALLING. WE GOT NOWHERE, AND WE WERE TOLD THAT IF YOU WANT ANYTHING -- IN MY OWN WORDS -- IF YOU WANT TO, IF YOU EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE AT THE SUMMIT OR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, YOU'VE GOT FIRST OF ALL TO BAN TEST-ING ETC. FIC. AND WITH REGARD TO SDI, AND, THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS. NO REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, UNTIL THERE IS A BAN ON SDI RESEARCH.

WELL. TODAY, IT WAS, I THINK, QUITE DIFFERENT. AND THAT ENCOURAGES US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A POSITIVE FEELING ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADER, AND THAT HE

# UNCLASSIFIED

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 003 NC 8319576
TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

WILL BE POSITIVE IN HIS APPROACH AT THE SUMMIT. HE INDICATED THAT IF THE U.S. WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. IT WOULD THEN HEAR FROM THE SOVIET SIDE THE MOST RADICAL PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS. IN OTHER WORDS. IF THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THAT QUESTION. THEN THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSALS TO PUT ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. AND YOU HOULD HEAR THEM THE VERY NEXT DAY AFTER YOU AGREE TO PROHIBIT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. SO THERE WAS NO HARD POSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT UNTIL YOU AGREE TO BAN RESEARCH THERE'LL BE NO AGREEMENT. THERE ARE OTHERS HERE WHO WILL ELABORATE ON THIS WITH RESPECT TO THE VERIFICATION OF RESEARCH, WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY RESEARCH, AND I THINK I SHOULD PAUSE FOR NOW AND LET THE OTHERS SPEAK. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD HAVE THIS KIND OF MODUS OPERANDA. THAT EACH SENATOR WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK. AND THEN WE'D FOLLOW WITH YOUR QUESTIONS AND, HOPEFULLY, SOME OF THE ANSWERS.

SEN. THURMOND: IT WAS A MOST INTERESTING MEETING. TOLD MR. GORBACHEV THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE LOOKED UPON HIM AS A NEW LEADER OF NEW IDEAS, NEW VISIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS, NEW ASPIRATIONS FOR THE BETTERMENT OF HIS PEOPLE, AND NEW HOPE FOR WORLD PEACE. I ALSO EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST. THERE ARE DIFFERENCES NOW, AND I AM SURE THERE WILL BE IN THE FUTURE. BUT WE CAN RESOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES. AND WE FEEL THAT THE SUMMIT IS A PLACE TO BEGIN. TANT WAINT BM CAR TART BHT BR DJUCHE MOITSUCER THERE'S A CHANCE THAT THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE. COURSE, AS SENATOR BYRD HAS EXPRESSED, HE BROUGHT OUT THE POINT THAT DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THEM. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? THAT MEANS. OF COURSE, THAT WE'D GET OUT OF SDI. THAT'S A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. NO ONE CAN SAY WHETHER, IF WE MAINTAIN THAT STRONG POSITION WHEN THEY MEET IN GENEVA. WHETHER

USINFO FOR P/PFE. P/RSE. EU. VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

STATE

95 8319576

SUO

PAGE 004 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

NC 8319576 

LENINGRAD FOR BPAN(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

THERE WILL BE ANY GIVE AND TAKE ON THAT OR NOT BUT HE DID INDICATE SOME FLEXIBILITY. AND I HAVE GREAT HOPES THAT SOMETHING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

NOW AS TO VERIFICATION, I WASPLEASED TO HEAR HIM SAY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD FAVOR VERIFICATION. HE SAID THEY DID AND, OF COURSE, WE DO. AND THAT'S IMPORTANT. I THINK AS A WHOLE THE MEETING WAS PRODUCTIVE. THEY INDICATED THAT IF WE GET OUT OF. IF WE BRING ABOUT DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE, THAT THEY LL MAKE IT GO ALONG, AS THEY, AS HE CALLED IT, I BELIEVE. A RADICAL CHANGE IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I THINK WHAT HE MEANT WAS A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THOSE KIND OF WEAPONS. THESE ARE ALL MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED. WE THINK THE MEETING WAS HELPFUL, WE THINK IT WAS PRODUCTIVE, AND WE THINK IT OPENS THE DOOR OF UPPORTUNITY FOR THE SUMMIT.

SENATOR PELL: TWO YEARS AGO, IT WENT BY VERY QUICKLY, TWO YEARS AGO I REMEMBER BEING HERE AND REPORTING ON A MEETING SET UP BY SENATOR BYRD WITH MR. ANDROPOV AT THAT TIME. AND I AND MY COLLEAGUES THOUGHT CONDITIONS WERE NOT TOO GOOD HERE THEN, AND THEY'RE COLDER AND GREATER ICE NOW THAN THEY WERE THEN. THE IMPRESSION I HAD OF GORBACHEV WAS, AS MRS. THATCHER SAID, HE IS A MAN WITH WHOM ONE CAN DO BUSINESS. HE SEEMED TOUGH. BRIGHT. ABIE AND ALERT. AND I'M SURE YOU ALL HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO HIM AS WE HAVE. I WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY ONE ARGUMENT HE PUT FORWARD IN THE CONNECTION WITH THE NEED FOR A MORATORIUM ON TESTING. FROM A LONG-TERM VIEWPOINT, FROM A POSITIVE VIEW POINT, HE MADE THE POINT THAT IF THERE IS NO TESTING. THEN THE MEAPONS SYSTEMS IN BEING WILL GRADUALLY BECOME OBSOLESCENT AND UNRELIABLE. THAT IS A LONG-TERM APPROACH TO RIDDING THE WORLD

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 005 NC 8319576 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

OF THESE WEAPONS, WHICH IS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE. I THINK, OF ALL OF US. THAT SEEMED THAT THAT WAS AN ARGUMENT. AT LEAST IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WAS AN ARGUMENT, SINGULARLY EFFECTIVE.

FINALLY, I WAS ABLE TO RAISE WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY THE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD TRY TO BREAK DUT OF THE ADVERSE WORDS WE'RE SAYING AT EACH OTHER. BUT HAVE SOME NEW IDEAS, COMPETE WITH IDEAS, AND NOT ARMS, AS SENATOR BYRD MENTIONED IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. AND IN THAT REGARD I MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT BOTH COUNTRIES COULD ENGAGE IN AN IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR CHILDREN ALL AROUND THE WORLD. AND BY 1990, WE COULD WELL HAVE EVERY CHILD UNDER FIVE IMMUNIZED FROM THE SIX DREADFUL CHILDHOOD DISEASES OF DIPTHERIA, POLID AND SO FORTH. OR WE COULD CREATE SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT TREATY WHICH WOULD HAVE A VERY REAL EFFECT. OR WE COULD TAKE THE MONEY FROM THE '72 LEND LEASE AGREEMENT WE MADE WITH THE SOVIETS AND SEEK TO HAVE THAT USED FOR THE EXCHANGE OF YOUNG RUSSIANS TO GO TO AMERICA AND YOUNG AMERICANS TO GO TO RUSSIA. AND I THINK THAT IF WE CAN START THINKING IN THESE MORE POSITIVE DIRECTIONS. WE WOULD SET THE CLIMATE A LITTLE MORE FAVORABLY FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING FROM WHICH WE ALL EXPECT SO MUCH.

SENATOR NUNN: JUST A COUPLE OF COMMENTS. I KNOW SENATOR BYRD DID A FINE JOB WITH PRESENTING IN A FORCEFUL WAY THE BASIC POSITION REPRESENTING OUR GROUP IN AN OPENING STATEMENT. AND OF COURSE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPONDED TO THOSE COMMENTS. THE MEETING, OVERALL, I WOULD AGREE WITH MY COL-LEAGUES' CATEGORIZATION AS PRODUCTIVE AS WELL AS INTERESTING. THERE'S NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS A VERY ENFRGETIC AND SKILLFUL LEADER. HE NOT ONLY, IN MY VIEW, WILL BE COMFORTABLE AT THE SUMMIT, HE IS SUCH A SKILLFULL LAWYER, HE WOULD BE COMFORTABLE AT A TRIAL LAWYERS! MEETING. HE PUTS FORTH THE VERY BEST CASE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT, AS WE'VE ALREADY HEARD, WE HAVE

STATE

85 8319576

PAGE 006 PAGE 006 NC 8319576
TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

VERY FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN. WE DID NOT SOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES TODAY. I THINK

USINFO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAN(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

WE DO NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

I WOULD PARTICULARLY POINT UP THE AREA OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. ORVIOUSLY, THAT'S BEEN ON THE SOVIETS' MIND FOR A LONG TIME, AND IT'S BEEN A POINT OF GREAT INTEREST AS IT WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED VERY STRONGLY TODAY. THE GOOD NEWS AS FAR AS I DETECTED AND PERCEIVED WAS THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH, IN HIS WORDS, IN OUR WORDS BASIC RESEARCH, CANNOT BE VERIFIED, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. HE DID NOT SAY, BUT IN MY WAY OF INTERPRETING IT. I THINK THAT'S CLEARLY AN EXCEPTION TO THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES! POSITION FOR A LONG TIME. THE BAD NEWS ON THAT SUBJECT IS THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH. IN HIS MIND. IS DEFINED VERY NARROWLY. OBVIOUSLY MUCH NARROWER THAN WE DEFINE IT. HE DEFINES IT ESSENTIALLY AS BEING WHAT YOU DO IN A LABORATORY, AND UNDER THE NARROWEST INTERPRETATION OF THE REMARKS. HE IS SAYING THAT WE WILL ALLOW YOU TO THINK. BUT BEYOND THAT, WE DID NOT GET A MUCH BROADER DEFINITION. AND OF COURSE THAT HAS GOT TO BE ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTALS THAT OUR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS COME TO GRIPS WITH IN GENEVA.

IN TERMS OF THE CHALLENGE. IT SEEMS TO ME THE REAL CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS TO TAKE THE DEFINITION THAT HAS NOW BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM THEIR LEADER AND TO AT LEAST TABLE A POSITION SO WE CAN BEGIN TO DISCUSS THAT IMPORTANT SUBJECT IN GENEVA. I ALSO

STATE

85 8319576 SUD

PAGE 007 NC 8319576 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

WOULD ADD UNDER THE TERM BAD NEWS THE FACT THAT IF YOU READ VERY CAREFULLY BETWEEN THE LINES OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THE SOVIETS RETAIN THEIR BASIC POSITION, WHICH IS THAT SOLVING THE STAR WARS DIFFERENCES IS A PRE-CONDITION TO THEM TABLING THEIR PROPOSALS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I THINK THAT IS CONTRARY TO THE GROMYKO-SHULTZ AGREEMENT IN JANUARY, WHERE IT WAS AGREED TO DISCUSS ALL OF THESE AREAS SIMULTANEOUSLY, AT LEAST THAT WAS MY INTERPRETATION. I WOULD HOPE THAT BEFORE THE SUMMIT, CERTAINLY DURING THE SUMMIT, THIS COULD BE CLARIFIED. BECAUSE IT WOULD BE MY HOPE THAT WE COULD DISCUSS BOTH OFFENSE AND DEFENSE SIMULTANEOUSLY. AND THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DO THAT IS IF THE SOVIETS DO AS WE HAVE DONE, AND THAT IS TABLE THEIR OFFENSIVE CUT PROPOSAL. THEY HAVE DESCRIBED IT IN DIFFERENT TERMS. THE MOST RECENT BEING "RADICAL." BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT UNTIL THAT PROPOSAL IS TABLED, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE IN GENEVA ON DEFENSES. BECAUSE IF OFFENSES ARE CUT BACK SO SIGNIFICANTLY ON A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS THAT WE NO LONGER PERCEIVE A DANGER IN TERMS OF FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AND IN TERMS OF VULNERABILITY OF OUR OWN SYSTEMS, THEN OBVIOUSLY THAT HAS TO AFFECT OUR POSITION ABOUT THE NEED FOR DEFENSE. SO I WOULD CHALLENGE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO TABLE THEIR PROPOSAL AS FAR AS A DEFINITION OF RESEARCH AND I WOULD ALSO CHALLENGE THEM TO TABLE A PROPOSAL AS TO WHAT THEY MEAN BY "RADICAL REDUCTIONS" AND ALSO TABLE A PROPOSAL ON THE ALL-IMPORTANT INTERMEDIATE MISSILES OR INF. WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT TO EUROPEANS.

ONE OTHER POINT THAT I THINK NEEDS UNDERLINING. SENATOR WARNER AND I AND OTHERS, INCLUDING EVERY-ONE HERE I BELIEVE. IS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE CONCEPT WE HAVE BEEN URGING FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS IN DIALOGUE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, THAT IS. THEIRISK REDUCTION CONCEPT. HE HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT GOING TO BE SOLVED EASILY. BUT THE ONE THING WE SEEM TO HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON, AND I HOPE THERE IS A GROWING REALIZA-

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 008 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85

NC 8319576 ...MOSCOW 12146

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TION ON BOTH SIDES OF THAT, IS THAT WE BOTH HAVE A REAL STAKE IN DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO DETER OR PREVENT WAR BY ACCIDENT OR WAR BY MISCALCULATION. I WON'T GO INTO THE DETAILS OF RISK REDUCTION, BUT ESSENTIALLY THE CONCEPT IS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN A CONTINUOUS WAY TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CERTAINLY TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF USE OF THOSE WEAPONS BY SUB-

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STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.D. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

NATIONAL GROUPS OR THIRD COUNTRIES FROM PRECIPITATING A CRISIS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. WE DID MAKE A SPECIFIC SUBMISSION TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV FROM SENATOR WARNER AND MYSELF, AND WE WERE ABLE TO REPORT TO HIM THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION NOW AGREES WITH US ON THE INITIAL CONCEPT. WE ARE URGING THAT OUR PRESIDENT BRING THIS UP AT THE SUMMIT, AND WE CERTAINLY ARE ALSO URGING THAT IT BE WELL-RECEIVED AND REACTED TO ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THANK YOU.

SEN. SARBANES: I THINK IT'S ALWAYS THE CURRENCY OF THE DAY TO SAY THAT THIS IS A PARTICULAR CRITICAL TIME FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I HAPPEN TO THINK THAT THAT IS IN FACT THE CASE AT THIS TIME, WITH A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY WHO'S OBVIOUSLY VERY MUCH, I THINK, IN CONTROLI OF THE SITUATION. I WAS WITH SENATOR PELL TWO YEARS AGO, ALMOST, GIVE ABOUT TEN DAYS, WHEN WE MET WITH CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV, WHO WAS VERY AILING AND IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS OF HIS LIFE, AND THE CONTRAST COULDN'T BE SHARPER IN TERMS OF WHAT WE ENCOUNTERED TODAY IN THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, WHO LIVED UP TO ALL THE REPORTS ABOUT HOW ABLE HE WAS

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 009 NC 8319576
TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

AND HOW EFFECTIVE HE WAS IN CARRYING ON A DISCUSSION OF THIS SORT. IT'S MY OWN VIEW THAT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS MAY WELL SHAPE: DEVELOPMENTS OVER SEVERAL YEARS TO COME, AND THEREFORE THAT THIS IS A PARTICULAR IMPORTANT TIME. WE TEND IN THE UNITED STATES TO ASK WHAT DOES GORBACHEV MEAN FOR THE U.S. I THINK HE'S OBVIOUSLY ASKING, WHAT DOES THE U.S. MEAN FOR GORBACHEV. AND WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO ASK OURSELVES THAT QUESTION AS WE THINK ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. I JUST WANT TO GIVE SOME FEW BROAD IMPRESSIONS. I'LL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY SPECIFICS LATER.

HE ATTACHED ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, TO THE SUMMIT. HE STRESSED IT REPEATEDLY, HE HAS THE PERCEPTION, WHICH HE INDICATED, THAT THERE ARE GROUPS THAT WANT TO THWART THE MEETING. IN OTHER WORDS. TO UNDERCUT ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS. AND HE SAID AT ONE POINT THAT WE MUST SHOW SOLICITUDE FOR THE SUMMIT, WE MUST SAFEGUARD IT. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND BUSINESS-LIKE VEGOTIATIONS AND IT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT OUR RELATIONSHIP ONTO A CONSTRUCTIVE TRACK. SECONDLY. HE HAD A VERY STRONG EMPHASIS ON ACTING IN WHAT HE CALLED A RESPONSIBLE MANNER. HE HAD EXAMPLES OF WHAT HE REGARDED AS TRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR. NOT BEING SERIOUS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN JS. AND THE NEED TO REALIZE THAT A VERY HEAVY RESPONSI-BILITY WAS BEING CARRIED BY BOTH SIDES AND THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSING OF THE ARMS ISSUES. THIRDLY, HE PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT OF WHAT I WOULD TERM RECIPROCITY IN ATTITUDES OF ONE COUNTRY TOWARD THE OTHER. MY OWN PERCEPTION OF THAT IS THAT THIS IS A MATTER TO AHICH THEY ARE VERY SENSITIVE. THAT HE, IN EFFECT. WANTS AND SEEKS AND EXPECTS A SORT OF AN EQUALITY OF ATTITUDE AND PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AS IT DEALS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE MADE THE POINT, FOR INSTANCE, THAT PROPOSALS THAT ARE SUBMITTED BY EITHER COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITH A PERCEPTION THAT THEY SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

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PAGE 010 Tor: 0321177 SEP 85

NC 8319576 MOSCOW 12146

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30TH COUNTRIES, THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD THINK OF THAT IN TERMS OF WHEN THEY SUBMIT THE PROPOSALS, OTHERWISE SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNREALISTIC. HE SAYS ALL THE FAULT IS NOT ON ONE SIDE, AND THAT 30TH SIDES MUST TAKE STEPS IF THE RELATIONSHIP IS TO BE SHIFTED TO A MORE, TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE 34SIS.

MY OWN OVERALL PERCEPTION IS THAT THERE'S SERIOUS BUSINESS AHEAD. WE'RE FACING A LEADER WHO IS IN HTS PRIME. WHO MAY, WITH EVERY EXPECTATION, BE THERE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. AND THEREFORE WE HAVE TO APPROACH THE SOVIET JAION, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME, WITH THE PERCEPTION AND THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HOW WE MOVE NOW IN SHAPING THE RELATIONSHIP MAY PROVIDE

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LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE WILL OPERATE FOR QUITE A PERIOD OF TIME TO COME. BUT THERE'S A CHANCE TO MOVE IT IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION, AND THAT WE NEED TO SEIZE THAT OPPORTUNITY RATHER THAN LATER BE TRYING TO ALTER COURSE IF, IN FACT, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SET IT OUT IN A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION.

SEN. DECONCINI: I'M SENATOR DECONCINI FROM ARIZONA AND CONCIR WITH MY COLLEAGUES' OBSERVATION OF THE SECRETARY AND HIS DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP AS PORTRAYED TO US TODAY AND OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. HE INDEED DEMONSTRATED TO ME FOR THE FIRST TIME A SOVIET LEADER WHO SAID TO US. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT WE MAY HAVE MADE SOME

### UNCLASSIFIED

STATE

85 8319576 SUO PAGE 011 NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

MISTAKES, MEANING THE SOVIETS, OBVIOUSLY COMING BACK AND ASSERTING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE MISTAKES AND WE MUST JOIN TOGETHER AND FIND SOME COMMON GROUND AND GET BACK ON THE QUOTE RIGHT TRACK TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS. I WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED WITH THIS CONTINUED ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION. I WAS HOPEFUL THAT THEIR POSITION IN RESPONSE TO THE DELEGATION'S POSITION, AS STATED BY OUR LEADER, ON HUMAN RIGHTS MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. AS SENATOR BYRD POINTED OUT. IT WAS NOT, AND WHEN AND IF HE READS THE ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS THAT WERE LEFT THERE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. I SUSPECT MR. GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE TOO KEEN ABOUT THEM. THIS DISTURBED ME A GREAT DEAL, BECAUSE IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO GET BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IT'S AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A REAL CHANGE IN OUR ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP, AND WE TRIED TO LEAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT UNLESS THAT POLICY AND POSITION IS CHANGED. THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A VERY ROCKY ROAD, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OPTIMISM THAT GENERALLY CAME ACROSS.

IF YOU LOOK AT SAKHAROV AND SHCHARANSKY. WALLENBERG, SOME OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, NOT TO MENTION THE LITERALLY THOUSANDS AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF APPLICATIONS THAT ARE LANGUISHING FOR FAMILY REUNIFICATION, YOU REALIZE, I REALIZE, AT LEAST, THAT THIS MAY BE THE ACHILLES HEEL OF A POTENTIAL GREAT LEADER TO BRING ABOUT A LESSENING OF THE TENSION BETWEEN THESE TWO POWERS. I DON'T ANTICIPATE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PRESIDENT. THIS ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS LESSENING ITS EMPHASIS IN THIS AREA. AND I HOPE THAT IF WE LEFT ONE IMPRESSION. THAT, SOME IMPRESSIONS, AT LEAST THAT WAS ONE OF THEM: THAT THIS IS NOT SOING TO GO AWAY, MR. GORBACHEV, IT'S GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE THERE DAY AFTER DAY. AND YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO FACE IT AND NOT TURN AND ACCUSE THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE WE HAVE RELATIONS

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

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PAGE 012

NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

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WITH CHILE, OR SOME OTHER NATION, THAT WE ARE VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS WHEN ANYONE IS FREE TO LEAVE OUR COUNTRY. BUT THAT'S NOT THE CASE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

SEN. WARNER: JOHN WARNER OF VIRGINIA. I'D JOIN IN SALUTING THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS DELEGATION. WE STARTED OUT FROM ANDREWS IN A 31-PARTISAN SPIRIT WITH A NOV-PARTISAN GOAL. NAMELY, TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND, HOPEFULLY, TO THE TALKS IN GENEVA AS WELL AS THE SUMMIT, AND WE'VE SUCCEEDED. THE QUESTION THAT DISAPPOINTED ME THE MOST WAS THAT MR. GORBACHEV FAILED TO EXPRESS EVEN A HINT THAT THIS GROUP OF SENATORS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY, FULL WELL UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THEIR ACCESS TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE THAT THE SOVIET JNION WERE (SIC) PARTICIPATING IN ASAT TESTS. CERTAIN TESTS WITH RESPECT TO SDI. IN A MANNER COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DO. AND THAT LEFT ME SOMEWHAT TROUBLED. DTHERWISE, HE APPROACHED US, I WOULD SAY, ON AN EQUAL FOOTING, RECOGNIZING THAT, HE SINGLED OUT

USINFO FOR PIPFE, PIRSE, EU, VOAIBRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAG(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356:

SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PAID SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE CONGRESS AND INDEED IN HIS PARLIAMENT HAD GOTTEN TOGETHER AND TALKED. AND THAT WAS A HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION.

ALSO THAT THE SENATE IS A UNIQUE BODY. IN THAT WE'RE A CONTINUING BODY. AND THE HEADS OF THIS DELEGATION, I THINK, MADE IT IMMINENTLY CLEAR

STATE

85 8319576 SUD

PAGE 013 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

NC 8319576

THAT NOW. UNDER THIS PRESIDENT, IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO MAKE A START, BUT THAT THE SENATE WOULD CONTINUE WITH THAT START, HOPEFULLY A POSITIVE OVE, AT THIS SUMMIT. AND THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THIS DELEGATION AND INDEED OF THE SENATE WOULD BE HERE WHEN THE NATION SELECTS THE NEXT PRESIDENT. AND THEREFORE, AS A CONTINUING BODY, WE WOULD HOPE TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE START UNDER THIS PRESIDENT. WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUMMIT -- AND I EXPRESS MY JAN OPINION HERE -- I GOT THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IT'S GOING TO BE GIVE AND TAKE, TO HIS PERSPECTIVE. AND HE'S READY TO GIVE AND HE'S READY TO TAKE, PROVIDING WE RECOGNIZE HIM AS AN EQUAL. HE'S A VERY PROUD MAN, HE'S PROUD OF THIS NATION, AND HE'S PROUD OF HIS PEOPLE, HE'S PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER A LONG HISTORY OF ADVERSITY. I DON'T MEAN TO INTIMATE THAT HE SWEPT US AWAY WITH HIS CHARM OR ANYTHING. HE ACCEPTED US AS EQUALS AS WE ACCEPTED HIM AS AN EQUAL. BUT BEING PROUD, AS HE IS, HE WILL GO INTO THAT SUMMIT WITH THE GOAL OF, REALLY, NO OVE COMES OUT A WINNER OR A LOSER. PROGRESS WILL BE MADE, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BOTH SIDES. BUT AS WEESAY IN FOOTBALL, THE BALLIWILL BE LEFT PROBABLY ON THE FIFTY YARD LINE READY TO BE PICKED UP AT THE NEXT SUMMIT. AND I MAKE THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTION THAT IN VIEW OF HIS EXPRESSIONS OF SINCERITY AND HOPE, POSITIVE HOPE ABOUT THIS SUMMIT, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO THINK OF A SUMMIT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

THE QUESTION OF THE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER WAS COVERED BY MR. NUNN. WE'VE BEEN WORKING ON THIS TOGETHER WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, INDEED, SOME FINE MINDS FROM ALL ACROSS THE COUNTRY, AND HE SEEMED QUITE IMPRESSED AND RECEPTIVE WITH THE DOCUMENTS THAT WE GAVE HIM, WHICH INDEED IS ONLY A MORKING PAPER BY MR. NUNN AND MYSELF, BUT DOES REFLECT SOME AREAS OF CONCURRENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. MR. NINN AND I MET WITH MR. MCFARLANE JUST BEFORE THE DELEGATION DEPARTED.

STATE

85 8319576 SUO PAGE 014 NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 ...MOSCOW 12146...

I ALSO BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF INCIDENTS AT SEA. AS YOU MAY RECALL, SOME FOURTEEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO I WAS DESIGNATED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AS THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR. I CAME TO THE SOVIET UNION OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AND SIGNED IN MAY OF 1972 THAT AGREEMENT. EACH YEAR THE TWO NAVIES HAVE GOTTEN TOGETHER AND HAD VERY CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS. ME RECOGNIZE, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE VALUE OF THIS MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LINK BECAUSE IT PROVIDES FOR THE SAFETY OF OUR MEN. AIRMEN AND SEAFARERS. AT SEA IN BOTH VAVIES. IT WAS MY HOPE, AND I EXPRESSED IT TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT THESE TALKS, WHICH WERE POSTPONED IN JUNE, COULD ONCE AGAIN BE RESUMED. AND LASTLY, I FELT THAT HE SPOKE VERY RESPECTFULLY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. AND I QUOTE HIM, IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE HIGH LEVEL OF RHETORIC. RHETORIC COMING FROM THOSE WHO ARE DISBELIEVERS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF THE SUMMIT. HE SAID, AND I QUOTE: "I RELY ON HIS WISDOM." END QUOTE. TO LEADTHEI UNITED STATES TO THIS SUMMIT, AND THAT IT WILL PROVIDE A POSITIVE AND EQUAL RESULT. THANK YOU.

SEN. MITCHELL: I AM GEORGE MITCHELL FROM MAINE. BEFORE COMING TO THE SOVIET UNION, I HELD THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS FOR A MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT EXISTED: DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BOTH STRATFGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES, ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN.

USINFO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

EXCHANGE FOR A PROHIBITION ON THE TESTING AND

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 015 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

NC 8319576

DEPLOYING OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS BY THE UNITED STATES. AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT AND. SPECIFICALLY, THE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH MR. GORBACHEV. AND THE MEETING YESTERDAY WITH SOVIET MILITARY OFFICIALS, MY VIEW HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. BELIEVE THOSE INGREDIENTS DO EXIST, BUT I ALSO HAVE BECOME AWARE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTY THAT WILL OCCUR IN ATTEMPTING TO BRING THOSE INGREDIENTS TOGETHER. ON THE ONE SIDE, THE SOVIETS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THEIR INSISTENCE THAT AN AGREEMENT ON PROHIBITING STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS MUST PRECEDE ANY FURTHER AND MORE SPECIFIC OFFER ON THEIR PART TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. MR. GORBACHEV'S USE OF THE WORD "RADICAL" TO DESCRIBE THE PROPOSALS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ON THE DAY AFTER AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO INDUCE MOVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES IN THAT DIRECTION.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE ADMINISTRATION IS OBVIOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO FOCUS DISCUSSION IN GENEVA UPON REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYTEMS, WITH LESS EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON ACTIONS ON SDI. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, SENATOR BYRD TOLD THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT HE HAD IN HIS GRASP AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. AN OVER-WORKED PHRASE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THIS CASE IS APPLICABLE. IT APPLIES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AS WELL. THE CHALLENGE BEFORE THOSE TWO LEADERS WILL BE HOW TO BRIDGE THE PROCEDURAL GAP, 404 TO BRING THE TWO POSITIONS TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE WHAT CAN BE AN HISTORIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT INTRODUCING RESTRAINT IN BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE, MR. GORBACHEV USED THE PHRASE "THE IMPERATIVE OF OUR TIME" TO DESCRIBE THE NEED FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO IMPROVE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. HE DID NOT USE THAT PHRASE TODAY. BUT HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR BOTH COUNTRIES TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. I AM PERSUADED THAT THE OPPORTUNITY DOES EXIST TO

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 016 NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146 

REACH THAT AGREEMENT, PROVIDED THERE IS FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION WHICH I'VE DESCRIBED. THE SECRETARY REPEATED WHAT HE SAID IN THE TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW IN ANOTHER AREA. AND SENATOR BYRD EXPRESSED THE SAME VIEW. THAT RAPID ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY MAKE IT CRITICAL THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD ARMS CONTROL BE ACHIEVED NOW. AND BY NOW I MEAN IN THE VERY IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THAT IS IN ADDITION IMPORTANT, AS CONVEYED TO US BY VARIOUS SOVIET OFFICIALS, BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW AN IMPORTANT PARTY CONGRESS WILL TAKE PLACE IN FEBRUARY, AT WHICH THE DIRECTION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PROGRAMS WILL BE SET FOR THE SUCCEEDING FIVE YEARS. IN ALL. I WON'T REPEAT WHAT'S BEEN SAID HERE, REGARDING MR. GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL DEMEANOR AND PERFORMANCE, I GENERALLY SHARE THE VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY MY COLLEAGUES. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

SEN. BYRD: NOW. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. WE'LL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. BEFORE WE BEGIN, LET ME SAY THAT AT A LATER HOUR TODAY, HOPEFULLY NOT TOO LONG. THE STATEMENT WHICH WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE. AND WHICH WAS JOINED IN BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. BOTH REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS. I CAN'T IDENTIFY YOU. IF YOU'LL JUST TAKE THE FIRST MAN HERE, IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH NAMES HERE, I'LL TRY TO HELP YOU.

I'D LIKE TO ADDRESS A QUESTION TO ANY ONE OF THE SENATORS. AMERICAN POLITICIANS HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT SOVIET LEADERS CANNOT BE TRUSTED. DID YOU HAVE THE FEELING AFTER YOUR MEETING TODAY THAT YOU COULD TRUST MR. GORBACHEV, AND BY EXTENSION, IF YOU DO FEEL THAT WAY, DOES THAT NOW MEAN THAT YOU CAN TRUST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT?

A: (SEN. SARBANES) WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT WE PROCEED

USINFO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

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PAGE 017 NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

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LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THAT BASIS. GORBACHEV HIMSELF TALKED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO ARMS TREATIES AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO THAT, AND OBVIOUSLY WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT AS WELL. BUT THE SIMPLE FACT IS. IS THAT THE ISSUES THAT ARE AT STAKE BETWEEN US ARE OF SUCH OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE: SINCE THAT WE'RE THE WORLD'S TWO SUPERPOWERS AND WE MUST TRY TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH ONE ANOTHER TO SEE IF WE CAN REACH ACCOMMODATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THOSE ISSUES. BUT THOSE ACCOMMODATIONS ARE REACHED ON THE BASIS OF, AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY HIMSELF SAID, HARD-HEADED BUSINESSLIKE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ACCOMMODATIONS WOULD REST ON THAT PREMISE. I THINK THE ASKING OF THAT QUESTION OR THE EMPHASIS ON IT MISSES THE POINT. IT'S QUITE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TO JNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH DIMINISH TENSIONS. IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP. MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS WORLD PEACE: AND STABILITY, WITHOUT HAVING TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. AND I THINK THAT'S THE PREMISE ON WHICH WE'VE BEEN PROCEEDING, I THINK IT'S THE PREMISE ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS PROCEEDING.

IT'S FOR SENATOR NUNN. YOU EXPRESSED ONE POSITIVE AND TWO NEGATIVES BY THE TIME YOU WERE FINISHED. SENATOR BYRD SEEMED A BIT MORE POSITIVE. AS AN EXPERT ON ARMS, DID YOU SEE ANY REAL MOVEMENT IN WHAT MR. GORBACHEV SAID, AND, BEYOND THAT, DO YOU THINK THAT HEIWAS TRYING TO OUTLINE A POSITION HE MIGHT BRING TO THE SUMMIT RATHER THAN TO OUTLINE IT TO YOU. SPECIFICALLY?

A: (SEN. NUNN) WELL. I DON'T CONTEND WE HAD A SUBSTANTIVE BREAKTHROUGH IN DUR CONVERSATION. I DO BELIEVE THAT THE COMBINATION OF HIS RECENT INTERVIEW PLUS THE AMPLEFICATION TODAY ON THE QUESTION OF

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 018 NC 8319576 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH NOT BEING VERIFIABLE AND THEREFORE IMPLICITLY NOT BEING PART OF ANY KIND OF PROHIBITION WITHIN THE ABM TREATY, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THAT IS A MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT THE CHALLENGE IS TO GET THAT DEFINITION, AS NARROW AS IT IS, TO THE TABLE IN GENEVA. AND THE SAME CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO DRASTIC CUTS. I THINK THE SOVIET UNION IS MAKING A REAL MISTAKE IN NOT TABLING A PROPOSAL DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY REALLY ARE WILLING TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CUTS IN OFFENSIVE MEAPONS AND IN INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS. IF THEY DO THAT, AND IF THEY ALSO DRAW THE LINE AS TO WHERE YOU DIVIDE RESEARCH FROM TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT, AND IF THEY ALSO CLARIFY FOR US THE CONCERNS WE HAVE ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING TREATIES -- IF THEY DO THOSE THREE THINGS. THEY WILL TEST THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. AND UNTIL THEY DO THOSE THREE THINGS, I DON'T THINK THEY'RE IN A POSITION TO TEST THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INTO THE SPIRIT OF THE SCHULTZ-GROMYKO AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS TO DISCUSS ALL OF THESE THINGS TOGETHER. AGAIN, UNLESS YOU DISCUSS OFFENSE AND DEFENSE TOGETHER, WE WILL NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT. THEIR CHALLENGE IS TO DISCUSS OFFENSE AND OUR CHALLENGE IS TO BE WILLING, ONCE THEY HAVE TABLED THEIR OFFENSE DISCUSSIONS AND POSITIONS, TO BE WILLING TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE.

SENATOR, CAN I JUST FOLLOW UP ON THAT BEFORE YOU SIT JUNN? HOW MUCH PROGRESS THEN, HOW MUCH MOVEMENT, IN YOUR WORDS, WHAT IS THERE, REALLY, IF SOVIETS SHOW SIGNS OF STICKING TO THIS NARROW DEFINITION OF WHAT RESEARCH IS?

A: (SEN. NUNN:) WELL, ONE OF THE REAL PROBLEMS IS THAT WE! HAVE GOTTEN IN OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN SOME PREVIOUS INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, WE HAVE GOTTEN MUCH MORE IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE THAN OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE GOTTEN AT GENEVA IN FORMAL TALKS. GENEVA IS WHERE WE HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THESE PROBLEMS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT GOING TO SOLVE THE

STATE

95 8319576 SUO

PAGE 019 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

NC 8319576

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FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. SO THE CHALLENGE IS TO TAKE SOME OF THINGS THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAS SAID,

USINFO FOR P/PFE, P/RSE, EU, VOA/BRU

STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

IN THE INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE, AND ALSO THE AMPLIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS IN OUR DIALOGUE AND PUT THOSE ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA. THEN I THINK IT WILL BE OUR TURN TO GIVE POSITIVE RESPONSES.

- Q: SENATOR, HASN'T THE AMERICAN RESEARCH ALREADY EXCEEDED THE PARAMETERS OF THE LABORATORY THAT GORBACHEV SET DOWN?
- A: (SEN. BYRD:) COULD I, I KNOW WHO WALT ROGERS IS. BUT COULD WE HAVE YOUR IDENTIFICATION ALSO NHEN YOU ASK A QUESTION?
- (SEN. NUNN:) WOULD YOU MIND REPEATING THAT, WALTER?
- SENATOR, HASN'T THE RESEARCH ON SDI ALREADY EXCEEDED THE PARAMETERS BEYOND WHICH GORBACHEV SAID HE'D BE WILLING TO TOLERATE, THAT IS, HASN'T THE AMERICAN WORK ON STAR WARS GONE OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY ALREADY?
- (SEN. NUNN:) CERTAINLY, OUR PLANS FOR RESEARCH FALL FAR BEYOND HIS VERY NARROW DEFINITION. AS I MENTIONED, IF YOU TAKE HIS DEFINITION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FROM IT, THEN HE IS SAYING YOU CAN THINK IN A CLOSED LABORATORY, BUT YOU CAN'T DRAW AND YOU CAN'T GO FURTHER THAN REALLY SIMPLY THINKING. I DON'T THINK THAT DEFINITION IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE

STATE

35 8317576 SUO

PAGE 020 TOR: 0321177 SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

NC 8319576

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. BUT I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY POSITIVE FOR THAT DEFINITION TO BE TABLED AS A FORMAL POSITION IN GENEVA, AND THEN WE WOULD RESPOND. SOMEWHERE AT SOME POINT IN TIME, AND I THINK GENEVA'S THE PLACE, THE TWO SIDES HAVE TO DRAW A LINE AS TO RESEARCH. IN MY VIEW, WE HAVE NOT DONE THAT AS CAREFULLY AS WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO DO IT. BUT THE WAY TO, TO USE THE WESTERN EXPRESSION, SMOKE US OUT, IN TERMS OF OUR OWN DEFINITION, IS FOR THEM TO TABLE THEIR DEFINITION. WHICH THEY HAVE NOT DONE.

(SEN. WARNER:) I THINK A SUBSIDIARY QUESTION TO THAT IS ON THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION. HE GAVE US THE IMPRESSION THAT THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS YOU COULD VERIFY EVERYTHING SHORT OF WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE HUMAN MIND. AND THAT POINTS OUT A SECOND AREA IN WHICH, IN MY JUDGEMENT, THERE'S CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY OF VIEWPOINTS AT THIS TIME.

- THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS HAS NOT YET BEEN SET. Q: AND ALREADY WE HAVE: MORE THAN ENDUGH AW LYSIS THAN WE CAN STAND. TODAY WE HEARD SOME OF THE OBJECTIONS OF THIS PANELL THAT HAS ONLY MET FOR PRELIMINIARY TALKS. DON'T YOU THINK THAT IN DISCUSSING THINGS LIKE THIS AND IN VOICING YOUR OWN OBJECTIONS EVEN BEFORE THE AGENDA IS SET, THAT IT MAY IN FACT SABOTAGE THE TALKS?
- (SEN. BYRD): LET ME SAY WITH REFERENCE TO THE RUSSIAN LEADER'S DEFINITION OF RESEARCH. I THINK IT IS TOO OFTEN OVERLOOKED. IT IS TOO OFTEN OVERLOOKED THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE ENGAGING IN, AND HAVE BEEN ENGAGING IN FOR A LONG TIME, RESEARCH IN CONNEC-TION WITH GROUND AND SPACE BASED WEAPONS. THEY'VE 30TTEN ALONG PREITY FUR ON PARTICLE BEAM AND ON LASER, RADIO FREQUENCY, KINETIC ENERGY AND SO ON. THEY NEVER MENTION THAT, AND SO I WOULD SUGGEST, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT SENATOR NUNN WOULD AGREE, THAT IF WE GO ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION OF MR. GORBACHEV, THERE'D HAVE TO BE SOME PULL BACKS AND A LOWERING OF THE SCALE OF TESTING, ETC. ETC.,

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 021 NC 8319576
TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 MOSCOW 12146

ON THIS SAME THING, THOSE SAME INTERESTS, THOSE SAME DEVELOPMENTS. NOW I'M SORRY, THE LADY WILL HAVE TO ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN.

Q: MY QUESTION WAS WHETHER YOU FELT....

(SEN. SARBANES): I THINK THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS NO. WE DON'T THINK THAT. WE THINK THE EFFORRS NE'VE MADE WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY

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STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER

TOWARDS THE SUMMIT. WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO GAIN A CLEARER PERCEPTION OF SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES. THAT THAT CAN BE HELPFUL. I THINK WE ALL ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE SUMMIT COMPARABLE TO THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY ATTACHED TO IT. I THINK THAT'S ONE OF THE MESSAGES WE WILL TAKE HOME WITH US. SO. SIMPLY PUT. I THINK THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS NO. WE THINK THIS WILL BE A HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A POSITIVE SUMMIT WHICH WE REGARD AS A VERY IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE.

ARE YOU ACTIVE IN THE FRAMING OF THE AGENDA, SIR?

A: (SEN. SARBANES): WELL, OF COURSE, THE FRAMING OF THE AGENDA IS UNIQUELY A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S, SO I DON'T KNOW THAT I WOULD USE THE TERM ACTIVELY INVOLVED. I THINK WE WILL SEEK TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO IT, OBVIOUSLY WE WILL REPORT ON OUR MEETING AND DUR IMPRESSIONS, BUT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT CARRIED ON BETWEEN THE CONGRESS OR MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY'RE CARRIED ON BY THE EXECUTIVE

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 022 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 NC 8319576 Moscow 12146

BRANCH OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

- J: (SEN. BYRD): ANYONE ON THIS SIDE?
- 9: I'D LIKE TO ASK SENATOR NUNN A QUESTION. HOW DID THE GEVERAL SECRETARY REACT TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT HE TABLE A DEFINITION ON RESEARCH IN GENEVA?
- 4: (SEN. NUNN): I DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO POSE THAT QUESTION DIRECTLY TO HIM IN THE DIALOGUE TODAY. HE DID ADDRESS THAT IN GENERAL, AND, AS I MENTIONED, IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE SOVIETS STILL HAVE A PRE-CONDITION FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS, AND THAT PRE-CONDITION, IN MY OPINION, IS THE EMPHASIS ON SOLVING THE STARS, THE SO-CALLED STAR WARS QUESTIONS. IN MY OPINION AGAIN, THAT IS A PRE-CONDITION, AND A PRE-CONDITION THAT IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE GROMYKO-SHULTZ ACCORD. I THINK BOTH SIDES HAVE TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, BUT I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY POSE THAT QUESTION TO HIM. I DID NOT HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY.
- 9: COULD YOU TELL US, WITH, HOW MR. GORBACHEV REACTED TO THE MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN?
- A: (SEN.BYRD): HE SAID IT WAS A GOOD LETTER, AND SMILED, AND INDICATED THAT HE THANKED THE PRESIDENT, AND ALSO THAT HE WISHED THAT WE WOULD CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT HIS BEST WISHES.
- Q: DID HE READ IT ON THE SPOT?
- A: (SEN. BYRD): HE READ IT RIGHT ON THE SPOT, HE DPENED THE ENVELOPE, ON THE SPOT. THAT WAS BEFORE WE GOT INTO THE DISCUSSIONS. ANYONE ELSE? THANK YOU VERY MUCH. OH, I'M SORRY.
- 9: (INAUDIBLE) ... THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS

STATE

85 8319576 SUO

PAGE 023 TOR: 032117Z SEP 85 NC 8319576 MOSCOW 12146

RECENTLY STEPPED UP ITS CRITICISM ON THE SOVIET UNION'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. RECENTLY THE SOVIET UNION POINTED DUT TO SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ THAT THE U.S.'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. WHAT, SPECIFICALLY, DO YOU AS SENATORS OF THE U.S. PLAN TO TAKE BACK TO THE U.S. IN TERMS OF CORRECTING THE U.S.'S OWN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

(SEN. BYRD): CAN WE HAVE YOUR NAME PLEASE?

MY NAME IS LENA SHERARD. (PHON.)

(SEN. BYRD) AND FROM WHAT ..?

I'M FROM THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK JOURNALISTS.

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STATE FOR H. EUR/SOV

LENINGRAD FOR BPAO(ALLIN)

E.O. 12356: N/A Subject: Codel Byrd Moscow Press Conference, September

A: (SEN. BYRD) I THANK YOU. THE QUESTION HAS TO DO WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET LEADER'S RESPONSES. GEORGE?

(SEN. MITCHELL) THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RESPONSE TODAY INCLUDED A STRONG STATEMENT ON DEFICIENCIES IN AMERICAN POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED SOUTH AFRICA AND CHILE, AMONG OTHERS.

AND, YOUR QUESTION IS, I DIDN'T HEAR IT, WHAT WILL WE TAKE BACK TO THE UNITED STATES?

3: WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WILL YOU MAKE TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON CORRECTING ITS OWN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS? AND I DO MEAN INTERNAL TO THE U.S.,

STATE

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
NOT EXTERNAL.

A: (SEN. MITCHELL) I'M NOT SURE WHAT INTERNAL ONES YOU'RE REFERRING TO. BUT THERE IS IN THE UNITED STATES A RATHER WIDESPREAD DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION, ON A VARIETY OF AREAS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA, SEVERAL OF US HERE HAVE TAKEN VIGOROUS EXCEPTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. ABSENT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT SPECIFICALLY YOU WERE REFERRING TO, ABOUT INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS, I'M NOT ABLE TO RESPOND.

- SPECIFICALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP INTERROGATIONS, SURVEILLANCE, BY U.S. CITIZENS, BY THE CIA, STEPPED UP SURVEILLANCE AND HARRASSMENT BY THE FBI, CASES THAT HAVE BEEN FORMULATED WITH NO BASIS, PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL ON VERY VERY SPECIOUS GROUNDS, ETCETERA, ETCETERA...
- (SEN. MITCHELL) WELL, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE ETCETERA, ETCETERA, BUT I'LL SAY THOSE ITEMS YOU'VE IDENTIFIED HAVE NO BASIS. I'VE SPENT MOST OF MY ADULT LIFE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, AND, WHILE IT IS IMPERFECT, I CHALLENGE YOU TO FIND ANY SYSTEM THAT IS MORE RESPONSIVE AND MORE APPROPRIATE, MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS. THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE TO MAKE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT I'D BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THAT WITH YOU ANYTIME. WITH RESPECT TO SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS BY THE CIA, THERE'S NO BASIS FOR THAT, THERE'S NO BASIS FOR THE OTHER ALLEGATIONS. COMBS

END OF MESSAGE

C



ACIS-386/85 5 September 1985

MEMORANDUM	FOR:	Director	of	Central	Intelligence
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Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Deputy Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

25X1 SUBJECT:

Support for November Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

- 1. At yesterday's SACG meeting, the instructions for the next round of the Geneva talks were largely approved, except for a few details to be worked out in the next day or so. Bud now wants to turn the NSC's attention to the larger issues surrounding the November meeting. For this purpose, a new support group for the SACG is being created.
  - 2. We have been tasked to provide the following in support of a meeting:
    - -- Proposed agenda items on which the NSC principals should concentrate at the 13 September meeting (ACIS);
    - A paper on the Soviet approach to the meeting for the SACG and White House coordinating group (SOVA);
    - A series of primers for the President on Soviet domestic and foreign policy issues (SOVA); and,
- Ad hoc support to Ambassador Matlock and his coordinating group.
- 2. In addition, the following projects were items tasked by you or have been initiated by the NIOs and offices:
  - -- A private analysis of potential strategic arms tradeoffs (NIO/USSR and SOVA);
  - -- An NIE on domestic stress in the Soviet system (NIO/USSR);
  - -- A SNIE on Gorbachev's foreign policy and approach to the meeting (NIO/USSR); and,

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
 A self-initiated p	paper on the	verification	implications	of the arms
control arrangemen	nts that the	Soviets have	been hinting	privately
about (SOVA).				

3. If there is more I can do to help you here, please call.

cc: DDI D/SOVA NIO/SP NIO/USSR

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# The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 04384-85 4 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

George Kolt

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

Suggested Discussion Item on Berlin Air Corridors

for DCI Meetings with NSC Officials

 Introduction and Summary. The forthcoming Reagan-Gorbachev Summit and particularly the resumption of talks on direct air links between the US and the USSR provide an opportunity for a diplomatic push to close the long drawn out Berlin air corridor discussions.

## 2. Current Situation in the Air Corridors

- For reservations up to 3500 feet the Soviets are now routinely granting a 10.5 mile reservation free space outside the Berlin Control Zone (BCZ). The Soviets say this is enough; the Allies want 17 but believe that 15 would be sufficient. The UK will probably soon push the Allies to go to the 15 mile (or even to a 13 mile) fall-back position.
- The Soviets disagree with the Allied contention that for each 1000 feet above 3,500 feet in Soviet air reservations. the Allies need an additional 5 miles of reservation-free space outside the BCZ. (If 17 miles for a 3,500 foot reservations, then 22 miles for a 4500 foot reservation, 27 miles for a 5500 foot reservation, etc.). The Allies would settle for 3 miles for each 1000 feet above 3,500 feet.
- In the BASC discussions the Soviets have alternated between promises of greater flexibility and hardline stances.
- In practice they have shown some flexibility. In June they provided 20 miles outside the BCZ for a 4500 foot reservation. Also in June, the Soviet controller readily

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approved an inadvertent British notification of a flight through the reserved airspace, and later stated that this was an example of Soviet flexibility (for an inadverent demonstration flight!). In August the Soviets approved an emergency request for a Pan Am aircraft encountering cabin pressurization problems to fly at 3000 feet through a reservation then in effect.

# 3. What Has Been Accomplished?

- -- In juridical terms the Soviets, by falling back from their original line that they had the unilateral right to impose rules in the Berlin Air Corridors, have recognized the principle of joint management of the corridors. The obverse of this is that, by accepting compensatory air space above 10,000 feet for Soviet air reservations, the Allies have lent additional credence to the Soviet contention that the air corridors normally extend only up to 10,000 feet--something we have long accepted de facto but still refuse to accept de jure.
- -- In practical terms, the safety of flights into Berlin has been improved by the 10.5 mile reservation free area outside the BCZ but the situation is still not satisfactory. We need those extra miles mentioned above and should get them as a matter of accepted routine rather than through shows of exceptional and occasional Soviet flexibility.
- -- There has been enough progress, however, so that the UK (and mostly likely France and the US as well!) will not want to resort to demonstration flights. Under these circumstances the outlook is for continued protracted discussions in the BASC with further progress doubtful.
- 4. The Summit and the likely reopening of the New York-Moscow air route, however, give us the opportunity to raise the issue in another venue. First, the general Soviet inclination before the Summit is to demonstrate reasonableness on relatively minor issues in the hope of getting US concessions on bigger issues. Second, it would seem strange for us to resume direct flights between our two countries while the Soviets are still imposing rules that endanger Allied (aircraft) in the Berlin air corridors. The major argument against making this link is that we have tried hard over the years not to let the Soviets pressure us in Berlin in order to get concessions somewhere else on the globe. I think this particular linkage is somewhat different. First, the Berlin Air Corridor safety issue deals with air matters and it is generically akin to the safety of Pacific Air routes--an item which, I understand, is part of the package on the New York-Moscow route. Second, we need not

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link Berlin directly to the New York-Moscow air route negotiations. Instead we can make the point that it would be hard for the US to sign a new air agreement while the Soviets were endangering air safety in the Berlin air corridors. We are not asking the Soviets for very much more in the Berlin air corridors. All we want is a few more miles--miles that are very important for safety and probably don't mean all that much to the Soviet Air Force. I think that the Soviets want Aeroflot back into New York badly enough--both for prestige and financial reasons--that they may well make that final Berlin air corridor concession that we seek.

5. This memorandum is predicated on the assumption that we have made a decision to reopen the New York-Moscow air route. Personally I am not convinced of the wisdom of letting Aeroflot reopen KGB fronts in this country or of the necessity for Pan Am to have a New York-Moscow route in order to get fly-through rights through Soviet airspace--which is what Pan Am is really after. But if we are going to reopen the New York-Moscow route, then let's use the occasion as a lever to settle our current Berlin Air Corridor problem.

George Kolt

NIC No. 04384-85 4 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

George Kolt

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

Suggested Discussion Item on Berlin Air Corridors

for DCI Meetings with NSC Officials

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
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NIO/LA 4 September 1985

## DCI/NIO REGIONAL CONFERENCE

# Potential Fighter Aircraft Delivery to Nicaragua

There are a number of indications that Nicaragua hopes to receive MIG-21 or L-39 jet combat aircraft in the next few months, and they may be pressing Moscow for delivery just before or after the scheduled US-Soviet Summit in November.

- -- Sandinista officials have stated publicly that as a result of the renewal of US aid to the Contras, they have lifted their self-imposed freeze on new weapons acquisitions, including jet fighter aircraft.
- -- A recent report Sandinistas are determined to test the limits of the US demarche against acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft.
- says there is there.
- -- Finally, Punta Huete airfield is already operational and is now being used by MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters.

the Sandinistas expected to obtain MIG-ZIs and/or L-39s last November, but Moscow may have been deterred by US warnings resulting from the "Bakuriani" incident.

- -- At that time, the Soviet ship "Bakuriani," suspected of carrying MIG-21s, made the first direct transit from the Soviet arms port of Nikolayev to Nicaragua, delivering a cargo of patrol boats and MI-24 combat helicopters.
- -- The Sandinistas subsequently announced a ban on new arms acquisitions, possibly seeking to turn the US demarche to their propaganda advantage.

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The Sandinistas have made a large investment in building a strong air force, and while they may be willing to delay acquisition of jet combat aircraft until after the US-Soviet Summit, they probably will press for delivery of SA-2 or SA-3 air defense missiles in the interim.

told us that Nicaraguan soldiers have completed training on the air defense missiles in Cuba, but the weapons have still not been delivered.

Ultimately, the decision on whether to deliver new jet combat aircraft or air defense missiles to Niaragua will have to be made in Moscow.

- The Soviets will have to calculate the impact of such deliveries on US-Soviet relations and international perceptions of whether they were committing an aggressive act.
- -- On the other hand, the Sandinistas may argue that the weapons need to be delivered soon or else they may be precluded by the potential conclusion of a Contadora Treaty which freezes new arms acquisitions.

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